Israel has considered the Iranian nuclear program to be an issue of the utmost gravity since the revelation of some of its more secretive aspects in 2002. In an attempt to rally global opposition, Israel promoted the idea that Tehran’s nuclear program posed an existential threat to the so-called Jewish state, and threatened to deploy air strikes against the country’s nuclear installations. The goal was to pressure the international community into acting militarily and decisively against Iran, or at the very least to intensify the sanctions regime. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu became perhaps the most outspoken Israeli commentator on the Iranian nuclear program. He also set a precedent for Israeli premiers in his public disagreement with the United States overs its aim of reaching a negotiated solution with Iran, sparking an unusual level of tension between Washington and Tel Aviv. Netanyahu had envisaged an end to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure through military strikes primarily conducted by the US, or, as an alternative, a tightening of international sanctions. Netanyahu’s government, therefore, consistently opposed all of the milestones achieved between Iran and international negotiators: the Joint Plan of Action, signed in Geneva in November 2013; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed in Lausanne in April 2015; and the final agreement sealed in Vienna on July 15.
There has been a spate of recent reports concerning Israeli-approved contacts between international envoys and officials from Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, over a potential truce of fixed duration between Israel and the Palestinian resistance groups in the Gaza Strip, in exchange for the lifting of the Israeli siege on Gaza which has lasted for more than eight years. The credibility of these reports has been boosted by the recent statements of Ismail Haniyeh, deputy chair of Hamas’ political bureau, that “Israel has informed certain parties [he did not name them] that it will not launch a new war on the Gaza Strip.” He went on to say, addressing the people of Gaza, “Good news, relief is at hand. The coming stage will be good for the steadfast people of Gaza.”
Abstract: This article tries to analyze the multiple aspects of separation barriers built by Israel since its inception in 1948, and evaluate their effectiveness in order to show whether such a policy makes Israel more secure. Even if each modern Israeli barrier has been built in a specific context, their goals overlap. Security concerns, perpetuation of Israel's occupation and annexation of more Palestinian lands remain the cornerstones of this philosophy. According to geographic location, these barriers can be divided into three categories: Separation Barriers in Occupied Territory; barriers as de facto borders between Israel and Arab countries; and Israeli Military Barriers on other occupied Arab territories.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas used the platform of the First International Conference for the Defense of Jerusalem, held in Doha in February of this year, to appeal to both Christians and Muslims of the Arab world, inviting them to visit and pray in the Israeli-occupied city. Abbas argued that such a move would constitute a form of resistance
The aim of this paper is to examine the sources of the current protest movement in Israel, its causes, and its relations with the shifts in Israeli economic policy over the last two decades. The protest movement entered the current Israeli scene as somewhat of a surprise; on the one hand, neither the general economic conditions, the particular economic disparities, the changes in economic policies, nor the country’s tax policies constituted a reason for a political or social protest movement over the last three decades.
As part of its initial publications, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies will soon issue a book in Arabic, titled The Secession of Southern Sudan: Risks and Opportunities.
The current article is the seventh chapter of the book, by researcher Dr. Mahmoud Muhareb.
The Israeli protest movement of July 2011 has been unprecedented in terms of longevity and scale, as well in terms of the variety of political forces taking part in it. This crisis has its roots in the socio-economic policies that have been adopted by successive Israeli governments over the last two decades, policies which have meant the abandonment of Israel's welfare state, and the implementation of “free market economics,” policies which have seen the privatization of public assets and a decrease in spending on public services.
Israel conducted top-secret negotiations with Lebanon’s Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh in Paris between mid-November and mid-December in 1948. While these talks were ongoing, Israel’s Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion made a decision to assassinate al-Sulh sometime between December 9 and 12, 1948. Since receiving the order to assassinate the Lebanese Prime Minister on December 12, 1948, two groups of Israeli Jews, posing as local Arabs in Beirut, tried to carry out the order, but were unsuccessful; on February 22, 1949, they received a new command cancelling the assassination.
The Israeli security establishment predicts that the democratic revolts across the Arab world and their potential ramifications will impose a reformulation of the Zionist state’s fundamental defense and security doctrines, as well as essential changes to the structure, preparedness and mobilization plans of the Israeli military; these will require an increase in the security budget, and a restructuring of its components so that it can respond to the anticipated threats.
There is no consensus on the definition of the concept of "National Security"; the definitions available are numerous and varied, with some reducing the notion of national security to its basic military aspects while others expand it to include all components of power in nations and states